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CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS-THRELKELD'S EX'RS v. SYNODI-
CAL PRESBYTERIAN ORPHANGE OF ANCHORAGE
An interesting problem in the construction of wills is involved
in the recent Kentucky case of Threlkeld's Ex'rs v. Synodical Pres-
byterian Orphanage of Anchorage.' In that action, brought by the
executors against the residuary legatee for a declaratory judgment
construing Threlkeld's will, the Court of Appeals was squarely faced
with a novel situation in which a testator attempted to make a spe-
cific gift of property which he did not own, either at the time of the
execution of the will, or at his death.
The facts were as follows: the testator, who, by the will m ques-
tion, disposed of an estate approximating $300,000, had executed a
codicil shortly before his death which read as follows: "I always ex-
pect to keep two automobiles I want E. 0. Magruder to have choice,
Mrs. Charlotte Callis the other."' At the time of his death, the testa-
tor did not own an automobile, having previously given the one he
did own to Magruder's son. He had, however, placed orders for a
Lincoln automobile and for a DeSoto, neither of which had been de-
livered prior to his death; nor did there exist, between the testator
and the automobile dealers with whom the orders were placed, con-
tracts valid under the Statute of Frauds,' for the-reason that such
contracts were oral, involving sums exceeding $500, no part of which
had been paid.
The trial court held that the executors were not authorized to
perform the oral contracts by accepting and paying for the two auto-
mobiles, nor to deliver the same, or their value, to the purported
legatees. From this decision, the executors, Magruder, and Mrs.
Callis appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judg-
ment, apparently on the sole ground that the extrinsic evidence
showing the placing of the orders for the automobiles by the testator
was properly excluded as being " of no assistance in arriving at
the testator's intention."' The Appellants had contended " that a
latent ambiguity in the clause in question arises when the language
of the will is applied to the facts of the case, and extrinsic evidence
should be admitted to show what the testator meant by what he
said." The court expressed the belief, however, that to do so would
be to " make a will for the testator, or to improve on the will as
found or to give to the language of the testator an intent not deduc-
ible from the will itself."'
1307 Ky 235, 210 S.W 2d 766 (1948).
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STUDENT N'OTES AND CO-MMENTS
The purpose of this note is to call attention to the novelty of the
fact situation-a situation so novel that considerable searching had
failed to disclose another case in point in any jurisdiction-and to
suggest another line of reasoning by which the court might have ar-
rived at the same result, which result the writer believes unques-
tionably correct.
At first glance the case appears to present a problem involving
the doctrine of ademption, which doctrine was aptly propounded in
the case of Dillender v. Willson:7
"Ademption, where satisfaction by payment
during the life of testator is not involved, is the destruc-
tion or extinction of a bequest by means of the sale or
other disposition of the things specifically bequeathed
and it is effected when by some act of the testator the
subject-matter has ceased to exist in the form in which it
is described in the will, so that on his death there is
nothing answering the description to be given to the
beneficiary To effect an ademption, the legacy or
bequest should be specific and not general for it can
apply only to specific gifts of which predisposition has
been made."'
It is, therefore, obvious that if the bequest of the automobiles
could be said to be specific, the non-existence of the subject at the
time of testator's death would necessarily cause an ademption of the
legacy. Under accepted definitions, however, it seems impossible to
classify as specific the bequest purportedly made by the codicil in
the instant case. For example, the following definition has the ap-
proval of the Court of Appeals:
"A specific legacy is said to be a bequest of a
particular thing, or a specified part of testator's estate,
which is so described as to be capable of identification
from all others of the same kind. The testator must intend
that the legatee have the very thing bequeathed, not
merely a corresponding amount in value or like prop-
erty "' (Emphasis writer's)
It will readily be observed that this definition requires such a
sufficiency of description as cannot be found in the Threlkeld instru-
ment. There is, in fact, no description at all; so that the possibility
of holding the bequest specific appears to be eliminated. There seems
little doubt that had the testator acquired the two automobiles be-
fore his death, .the ownership thereof would have been sufficient to
identify them. This would be true because of the fact that a will is
228-Ky. 759, 16 S.W 2d 173 (1929).
'Id. at 760, 16 S.W 2d at 174.
Howe v. Howe's Ex'x, 287. Ky 756, 763, 155 S.W 2d 196, $00
(1941) Ruh's Ex'x v. Ruh, 270 Ky 792, 803, 110 S.W 2d 1097, 1103
(1937).
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held to speak as of the time of the death of the testator."0 If, however,
Mr. Threlkeld owned no automobile at the time of his death, there is
no manner in which to identify the subject of the gift.
Similar difficulty is encountered in an attempt to reconcile the
bequest with the acceped definition of a general legacy, which is
said to be " one which may be satisfied out of testator's estate
generally, by delivering any part of his estate which corresponds
with it in value or in general description to the provisions of the
will. "" Obviously from the description included, the value of
"two automobiles" is not ascertainable; hence, it may be seriously
doubted that the codicil in question could accurately be classified
either as general or specific. There exists also grave doubt as to the
propriety of speaking in terms of "ademption" where the testator did
not own the property when he made his will nor acquire it there-
after."- It is therefore concluded that the court properly avoided
basing its decision, even in part, upon the doctrine of ademption.
It is also believed that the court was correct in its conclusion
that " no ambiguity in the description of this property"' existed,
and in its refusal, as a result of the first conclusion, to admit ex-
trinsic evidence " to create an ambiguity which did not exist on
the face of the will and then proceed to dissolve that ambiguity by
accepting additional extrinsic evidence as to the testator's intent."'"
It is submitted, however, that even had such evidence been received
without objection, there would exist no ground for permitting the
executors to perform the oral contract for the purchase of the auto-
mobiles and deliver them to the purported legatees.
It is often quoted as a general rule that a testator can only dis-
pose of property which he owns."= This would appear to be true ex-
cept, perhaps, in the case of a direction to buy In Corpus Jurts it is
stated:
"The testator may direct that property be pur-
chased for a beneficiary and such a provision is good
where it is possible to ascertain from the will the descrip-
tion of the property to be purchased or the amount which
shall be paid for it, although the rule is otherwise where
these facts cannot be ascertained.""1 (Emphasis writer's).
Clearly, however, it is impossible to say from the will that the testa-
tor directed his personal representative to buy automobiles. Hence,
"Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 66 F 2d 116 (1933)
U.S. Trust Co. v. Winchester, 277 Ky 434, 126 S.W 2d 814 (1939)
Noe's Guardian v 'McKinney, 229 Ky 726, 17 S.W 2d 1007 (1929)
"2 PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS sec. 1226 (2d ed. 1926)
122 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 11, sec. 1328.
Threldeld's Ex'rs v Synodical Presbyterian Orphanage of
Anchorage, supra note 1 at 239, 210 S.W 2d at 768.
"Id. -at 239, 210 S.W 2d 769..
11.1 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 11, sec. 198.
"69 C. J. 371.
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
one is believed justified in concluding that the codicil in question
could not possibly be construed as a direction to buy.
In Phillips v. Murphy'- it was said:
"A will speaks from the death of the testator
and it cannot operate to dispose of property, though men-
tioned in and attempted to be devised by its provisions,
of which the testator was not the owner at the time of his
death.,"
It is therefore submitted that, since the evidence of the existence
of the unenforceable contracts did not establish ownership, either
legal or equitable, of the automobiles in the testator, the purported
legacy must fail both as a specific and as a general legacy.
JOuN R. GILLESPIE
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